

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 078940
ORIGIN INR-10

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 EUR-12 ISO-00 AF-10 IO-13 CIAE-00
NSAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 (ISO) R

DRAFTED BY INR/RAR:DSMITH; EUR/RPM:TMSAVAGE
APPROVED BY EUR/RPM:SJLEDOGAR
INR/OD:MPACKMAN
ARA/CCA:WSMITH
AF/I:ISTRAUS
EUR/SOV:RPERITO

-----009475 280507Z /66

P R 280012Z MAR 78
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
INFO USINT HAVANA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

S E C R E T STATE 078940

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PORG, XA, CU, UR

SUBJECT: POLADS SPECIAL PROJECTS -- SOVIET AND CUBAN
MILITARY PENETRATION IN AFRICA

REF: A) STATE 61698 (NOTAL); B) USNATO 1563 (NOTAL)

FOLLOWING ANALYSIS PROVIDED FOR MISSION'S USE IN
CONNECTION WITH ONGOING POLADS EXCHANGE ON SUBJECT. YOU
MAY DRAW AS APPROPRIATE UPON PAPER DURING MARCH 28 AND
SUBSEQUENT POLADS MEETINGS TO ORALLY BRIEF ALLIED DELS
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 078940

ON US ASSESSMENT OF CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA. DUE
TO SENSITIVITY OF MATERIAL, WE CANNOT AUTHORIZE
CIRCULATION OF TEXT IN WRITTEN FORM; MISSION MAY,
HOWEVER, CIRCULATE AS SUMMARY PARAS 61-66 OF US
CONTRIBUTION TO NATO EXPERTS MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA.

BEGIN TEXT:

CASTRO'S AFRICAN POLICY: STRONG MOTIVATIONS, FEW
RESTRAINTS

1. TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, CASTRO HAS BECOME A HOSTAGE TO HIS OWN ACTIVISM IN AFRICA. CUBA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA (WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY HAS GROWN

FAR GREATER AND LASTED MUCH LONGER THAN ANTICIPATED AT THE OUTSET) HAS CREATED EXPECTATIONS IN AFRICA THAT CUBA WOULD RESPOND GENEROUSLY TO ALL REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND THE CUBANS HAVE ENCOURAGED SUCH EXPECTATIONS THROUGH PRIVATE TALKS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

2. HAVING PROCLAIMED CUBA THE CHAMPION OF "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" IN AFRICA, CASTRO FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST BEING DRAWN FURTHER INTO INVOLVEMENTS IN DEFENSE OR SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS THAT BEAR THE REQUISITE "REVOLUTIONARY" CREDENTIALS. REFUSAL TO RESPOND TO ESCALATING PLEAS FOR ASSISTANCE WOULD RUN COUNTER TO CASTRO'S STRONG SENSE OF MISSION AND HIS DESIRE TO ESTABLISH CUBA AS A MAJOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA.

3. WHILE CASTRO IS NOT WHOLLY IMMUNE TO PRAGMATIC
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 078940

CONSIDERATIONS, POTENTIAL RESTRAINING FACTORS ARE WEAK, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT.

-- SOVIET AND CUBAN OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA, WHILE NOT SYNONYMOUS, ARE CLEARLY COMPLEMENTARY, AND THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO UNDERWRITE THE MAJOR COSTS OF CUBAN COMMITMENTS IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

-- WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, AFRICAN LEADERS HAVE NOT OBJECTED PUBLICLY TO THE GROWING CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA, AND INFLUENTIAL SPOKESMEN SUCH AS TANZANIA'S NYERERE AND ZAMBIA'S KAUNDA CONTINUE TO ACQUIESCE IN AN EXPANDING CUBAN ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- THE CUBANS HAVE YET TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR MILITARY SETBACK; EXCEPT FOR A FEW ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE BRIEF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA IN 1975, THEY HAVE BEEN FIGHTING AGAINST POORLY TRAINED AND ILL-EQUIPPED FORCES WHICH CAN INFLICT FREQUENT CASUALTIES BUT ARE UNABLE TO MOUNT AN OFFENSIVE THAT WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF CUBA'S MILITARY PRESENCE.

-- IN BOTH ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA THERE IS A HEAVY MATERIEL ADVANTAGE IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET/CUBAN-SPONSORED FORCES. A CHANGE IN THE BALANCE IN RHODESIA MAY BE SOMEWHAT MORE DISTANT, BUT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE PREPARED

TO GIVE NKOMO AS MUCH MATERIEL AS HIS FORCES CAN ABSORB.

4. AFRICAN MISGIVINGS ABOUT AN INCREASING CUBAN PRESENCE MAY GROW STRONGER, PARTICULARLY IF CUBA IS INCREASINGLY PERCEIVED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY. BUT THE SITUATIONS IN WHICH CUBA HAS TAKEN OR IS LIKELY TO ASSUME A COMBAT ROLE PLACE CUBA LARGELY ON THE SIDE OF PRINCIPLES THAT ARE WIDELY SUPPORTED IN AFRICA (SANCTITY OF EXISTING BORDERS, BLACK SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 078940

MAJORITY RULE, OPPOSITION TO SOUTH AFRICA) AND THUS PROVIDE OSTENSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CUBA'S ACTIONS.

5. CUBA HAS FOUND ITSELF ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE FENCE FROM MOST ARAB COUNTRIES OVER ETHIOPIA, AND CASTRO'S INTEREST IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT IN THE HORN PROBABLY STEMS IN LARGE PART FROM HIS DESIRE TO AVOID A SPLIT WITH ARAB SUPPORTERS OF ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE GROUPS AND SOMALIA. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CUBANS REALIZE THAT THEIR AGGRESSIVE AFRICAN POLICY COULD BECOME A DIVISIVE ISSUE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM), AND THEY ARE LOBBYING TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF MODERATE OPPOSITION TO THEIR ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE 1979 NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN HAVANA.

6. THE LEADING NON-ALIGNED MODERATES ARE ALSO CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING UNITY WITHIN THE NAM, HOWEVER, AND DO NOT YET APPEAR INCLINED TO ORGANIZE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE BASED ON CUBA'S AFRICAN ACTIVITIES OR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT GIVES LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT ANTI-CUBAN OPPOSITION WILL DEVELOP. MOREOVER, GIVEN CUBA'S DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE RADICAL CHARACTER OF THE NAM, CASTRO WOULD NOT BE PARTICULARLY DISTRESSED IF A FEW PRO-WESTERN MEMBERS DECIDED TO BOYCOTT NEXT YEAR'S SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN HAVANA.

7. WHILE AFRICAN AND/OR ARAB PRESSURES COULD HAVE SOME MARGINAL IMPACT ON CUBAN DECISIONS, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BECOME INTENSE ENOUGH TO INDUCE CUBA TO REMOVE ITS COMBAT FORCES FROM ANGOLA OR ETHIOPIA OR TO REFRAIN FROM INCREASING THEM IF THE MILITARY SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 078940

SITUATION REQUIRES IT.

COUNTRY DISCUSSIONS

8. ANGOLA. THE CUBANS' HEAVIEST INVOLVEMENT REMAINS IN ANGOLA. THE EUPHORIA OF CUBA'S EARLY VICTORIES IS

LARGELY GONE AS THE CUBANS TRY TO REBUILD ANGOLA'S ECONOMY, IMPOSE SOME ORDER ON THE MPLA'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY, AND CONTROL STRONGLY-ROOTED INSURGENCIES BY RIVAL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS. CASTRO HAS INVESTED MUCH OF HIS PRESTIGE, AS WELL AS CUBAN HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES, IN MAKING THE MPLA A SUCCESS, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NETO GOVERNMENT STILL CANNOT MAINTAIN ITS HOLD WITHOUT VERY SIZEABLE CUBAN MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

9. NETO'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER BASED ON CUBAN AND SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION INITIALLY PRODUCED A SPLIT WITHIN THE OAU OVER WHETHER THE MPLA SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. GENERAL AFRICAN RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA CAME GRADUALLY (AND IN SOME CASES, GRUDGINGLY) IN REACTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ILL-TIMED INTERVENTION AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS A PRAGMATIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CUBA'S APPARENT DEFEAT OF THE MPLA'S RIVALS.

10. AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ARE RELUCTANT TO CRITICIZE THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA OPENLY FOR VARIOUS REASONS:

-- THOSE WHO ARE FRIENDS OF UNITA ARE DEFENSIVE ABOUT UNITA'S SUSPECTED SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT.

-- OAU GOVERNMENTS OF ALL PERSUASIONS ARE LEERY OF CHALLENGING THE RIGHTS OF MEMBER STATES TO SEEK
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 078940

OUTSIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

-- ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WANT TO RETAIN THE OPTION OF ENLISTING CUBAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

11. THE NETO GOVERNMENT IS STILL WIDELY PERCEIVED, HOWEVER, AS A CUBAN/SOVIET CLIENT, IF NOT PUPPET, AND CONTINUING AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT DEPENDS TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE ON MAINTAINING AN AURA OF CUBAN SUCCESS AND INVINCIBILITY. IF THE MPLA REGIME WERE TO COLLAPSE BECAUSE HAVANA WITHDREW THE SUPPORT NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN IT, THE CUBANS WOULD BE SEEN BY AFRICANS AND OTHERS AS UNRELIABLE.

12. THUS IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR CASTRO TO REMOVE OR SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE CUBA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA. MOREOVER, DESPITE THE HUMAN COST

OF THE MILITARY EFFORT AND THE DISRUPTIONS IT HAS CAUSED IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY, CASTRO PROBABLY SEES NO COMPELLING REASON TO DO SO AT PRESENT. IF THE CUBAN/MPLA FORCES CAN SUCCEED IN SUPPRESSING UNITA, FNLA, AND FLEC INSURGENCIES AND GUARANTEE EFFECTIVE MPLA CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY, THE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT CAN BE PORTRAYED BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD AS A SIGNAL TRIUMPH OVER THE FORCES OF "WESTERN IMPERIALISM." A SUCCESSFUL DENOUEMENT IN ANGOLA WOULD HELP SECURE CUBA A POSITION AS PRIMUS INTER PARES IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND PERHAPS ENHANCE CASTRO'S LEVERAGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

13. CONVERSELY, A PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 078940

UNDER PRESSURE (WHETHER MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC) THAT WOULD HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF DEFEAT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISH CASTRO'S INTERNATIONAL STATURE. IT COULD ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT HIS PERSONAL PRIMACY OVER THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY BY STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF ELEMENTS WHO FAVOR A MORE CAUTIOUS FOREIGN POLICY.

14. WHILE THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH, THE PRESENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA IS AT LEAST TOLERABLE, AND CUBA IS TOO HEAVILY COMMITTED TO BACK OUT NOW. DESPITE TENTATIVE INDICATIONS THAT SOME CUBAN OFFICIALS ARE BEGINNING TO FEAR THAT CUBA IS OVEREXTENDING ITSELF IN AFRICA, CASTRO AND HIS IMMEDIATE CIRCLE OF ADVISERS GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF HAVING A "LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL" SYNDROME, WHICH IS REINFORCED -- IF NOT ENGENDERED -- BY THEIR IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION THAT THE FORCES OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM WILL INEVITABLY TRIUMPH.

15. THERE SEEMS LITTLE BASIS IN THE ANGOLAN SITUATION FOR SUCH OPTIMISM FROM THE CUBAN STANDPOINT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EITHER THE MPLA OR ITS OPPONENTS -- SINGLY OR IN CONCERT -- WILL BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT MILITARILY. THOUGH THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT MAY BE ACHIEVING SOME SUCCESS IN CABINDA AND THE NORTH, THE UNITA INSURGENCY IN THE SOUTH APPEARS CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING A PROLONGED AND INTENSIFIED MPLA/CUBAN OFFENSIVE.

16. IN THE SHORT RUN, CUBA WILL PROBABLY BE WILLING TO DISPATCH ADDITIONAL MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN ADVISERS IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDEEM THE INVESTMENT IT HAS

ALREADY MADE, BUT A CONTINUING MILITARY STALEMATE COUPLED WITH FURTHER POLITICAL TURMOIL WITHIN THE MPLA

MIGHT WELL EVENTUALLY DAMPEN CUBA'S ARDOR FOR MAINTAINING
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 078940

A LARGE MILITARY FORCE IN ANGOLA. THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE CUBAN TROOPS IS LIKELY TO DEPEND MUCH LESS ON EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON CUBA THAN ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN ANGOLA, PARTICULARLY REGARDING SOME SORT OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE MPLA AND ITS RIVALS. SUCH A SOLUTION MAY BECOME INCREASINGLY ATTRACTIVE TO HAVANA AS TIME GOES ON, BUT THAT TIME IS NOT YET.

17. ETHIOPIA. CUBA'S COMMITMENT IN ETHIOPIA IS BASED LARGELY ON CASTRO'S HIGH REGARD FOR MENGISTU AS A GENUINE MARXIST-LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT A RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF ETHIOPIAN SOCIETY THAT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS PARALLELS CUBA'S EXPERIENCE. CASTRO'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO ASSURE THE VIABILITY OF THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME, AND HE NOW APPARENTLY FEELS THAT THIS GOAL CANNOT BE ATTAINED UNTIL ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY SITUATION IS SECURE.

18. AS IN ANGOLA, THE CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA HAS EXPANDED FAR BEYOND WHAT WAS PROBABLY ANTICIPATED WHEN THE FIRST CUBAN ADVISERS ARRIVED LAST SPRING. IN THE WAKE OF THE SOMALI CONQUEST OF MOST OF THE OGADEN IN LATE SUMMER AND CONTINUING INSURGENT GAINS IN ERITREA, THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY SITUATION LOOKED INCREASINGLY DESPERATE BY OCTOBER, AND THE MENGISTU REGIME'S STABILITY WAS FURTHER THREATENED BY POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNAL DISSENTION WITHIN THE DERGUE.

19. THE SOMALI DECISION IN NOVEMBER TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH HAVANA AND EXPEL ALL CUBAN AND SOVIET ADVISERS REMOVED THE LAST MAJOR OBSTACLE TO LARGE-SCALE CUBAN
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 078940

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA. WITH CLEAR SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT, AS WELL AS MATERIAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA EXPANDED QUICKLY. THE TOTAL IS NOW IN EXCESS OF 13,000, AND RECENT CUBAN STATEMENTS HAVE SHOWN NO SIGN OF WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN WITHDRAWALS.

20. THE CUBAN FORCES APPARENTLY INCLUDE A FULL COMBAT DIVISION OF AT LEAST 7,000 MEN, WHICH HAS PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN THE EASTERN OGADEN, GIVING THE CUBANS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY AND

PERMITTING THEM TO UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS LARGELY INDEPENDENT OF ETHIOPIAN FORCES. MOREOVER, CUBAN PILOTS FLYING ETHIOPIAN MIGS HAVE HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE FIGHTING.

21. CUBAN AND SOVIET OFFICERS HAVE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH ETHIOPIAN OFFICIALS ON MILITARY STRATEGY, THE MAIN POINTS OF WHICH APPEAR TO BE:

-- DEFEAT AND EXPULSION OF SOMALI FORCES FROM THE OGADEN;

-- DEFENSE OF THE PORT OF ASSAB AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE COAST TO ADDIS ABABA; AND

-- REINFORCEMENT AND RETENTION OF REMAINING ETHIOPIAN GARRISON IN ERITREA.

22. THE PROBLEM OF ERITREA IS LIKELY TO PROVE MUCH MORE INTRACTABLE, BUT THE CUBANS MAY CALCULATE THAT THEY CAN PRESERVE A CHANCE FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH ONE OR MORE OF THE ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS THAT WOULD ALLOW ETHIOPIA TO RETAIN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE REGION UNDER SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 078940

SOME FORM OF FEDERATION. CUBA'S RECENT COURTSHIP OF IRAQ -- ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL BACKERS OF THE ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT -- MAY WELL BE RELATED TO THIS GOAL.

23. WITH THE EXPULSION OF SOMALI TROOPS FROM THE OGADEN, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE LITTLE REASON TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ETHIOPIA BEYOND THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY PAYING FOR MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE PRIMARY COSTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN OPERATION, THE SECONDARY COSTS CAUSED BY ADDITIONAL DISRUPTION OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY ON TOP OF THOSE COSTS ALREADY IMPOSED BY THE LARGER ANGOLAN INVOLVEMENT STILL REPRESENT AN APPRECIABLE BURDEN FOR CUBA.

24. THE CUBANS THEREFORE MAY BE DISPOSED TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN ETHIOPIA GRADUALLY AS NEWLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED ETHIOPIAN UNITS BECAME CAPABLE OF TAKING OVER THE TASK OF DEFENSE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS AGAINST SOMALI GUERRILLAS IN THE OGADEN. THIS PROCESS PROBABLY WILL REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF SEVERAL MONTHS, HOWEVER, AND EVEN IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES A CUBAN MILITARY FORCE OF AT LEAST A FEW THOUSAND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN ETHIOPIA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

25. A NUMBER OF FACTORS COULD ALTER THIS SCENARIO,

HOWEVER, AND MILITATE IN FAVOR OF MAINTAINING A CUBAN FORCE AT OR NEAR THE PRESENT LEVEL.

-- IF THE SOMALIS BEGIN RECEIVING LARGE-SCALE MILITARY AID OR, MORE IMPORTANTLY, COMBAT TROOPS FROM SYMPATHETIC MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FEAR RENEWED SOMALI AGGRESSION AND USE THIS AS SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 078940

A JUSTIFICATION FOR KEEPING A LARGE CUBAN COMBAT FORCE IN THE AREA (AS IN ANGOLA).

-- IF THE ETHIOPIANS EMBARK ON A MAJOR CAMPAIGN IN ERITREA, A LARGE CUBAN FORCE MIGHT WELL BE REQUIRED TO SECURE THE OGADEN AND FREE ETHIOPIAN UNITS FOR SERVICE IN THE NORTH. FOR BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY REASONS, THE CUBANS PROBABLY WOULD PREFER TO LIMIT THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN ERITREA, BUT THEY MAY FIND THIS DIFFICULT IF THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT PRESSURES THEM TO LEND COMBAT ASSISTANCE.

-- IF THE SOMALIS MOUNT AN UNEXPECTEDLY TENACIOUS INSURGENCY IN THE OGADEN, OR IF THE ETHIOPIAN AND/OR CUBAN FORCES CARRY THE FIGHTING INTO SOMALIA, THEREBY PROVOKING FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE CUBANS MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO RAISE THEIR TROOP STRENGTH EVEN HIGHER.

26. EVEN IF THE MILITARY SITUATION PERMITS A PARTIAL DRAW-DOWN OF CUBAN MILITARY FORCES IN ETHIOPIA, THE CUBANS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY REMAIN A STRONG PRESENCE THERE (THOUGH PROBABLY NOT AS PERVASIVE AS IN ANGOLA). THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TECHNICAL AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL IS LIKELY TO INCREASE, AND CUBAN POLITICAL CADRES WILL PROBABLY ASSIST IN SETTING UP MASS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS USING CUBAN MODELS.

27. RHODESIA. THE INSURGENCY AGAINST SMITH'S REGIME PRESENTS THE CUBANS WITH BOTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS. CHIEF AMONG THE LATTER HAS BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ELIMINATE ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND DEVELOP A FIGHTING FORCE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT PUNISHING STRIKES WITHIN RHODESIA. MUGABE'S MOZAMBIQUE-BASED ZANU FORCES HAVE NOT PROVED VERY EFFECTIVE AS GUERRILLAS SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 078940

AND HAVE BEEN SEVERELY HURT BY RHODESIAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.

28. THE CUBANS NOW SEEM TO HAVE THROWN THEIR SUPPORT TO ZAPU AND NKOMO, WHO APPEARS MUCH MORE CREDIBLE AS A POLITICAL LEADER, EVEN IF HIS ALLEGIANCE TO HIS SOVIET AND CUBAN SPONSORS IS TO A GREAT EXTENT OPPORTUNISTIC.

29. DESPITE THESE TIES, CUBAN COOPERATION WITH ZAPU IS CONSTRAINED BY KAUNDA'S RESIDUAL MISTRUST OF HAVANA'S INTENTIONS AND HIS RELUCTANCE TO PERMIT LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ZAMBIA. KAUNDA MAY WELL FEAR THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CUBAN PRESENCE IN ZAMBIA WOULD ENCOURAGE INTENSIFICATION OF RHODESIAN RAIDS ON ZAMBIA, AS HAS OCCURRED IN MOZAMBIQUE, AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME DEPENDENT ON CUBAN FORCES FOR DEFENSE. ZAPU HAS YET TO PROVE ITSELF AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE, AND ZAMBIA'S ZAMBEZI RIVER BORDER WITH RHODESIA HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE TO MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS INTO RHODESIA.

30. IT IS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT NEITHER ZAPU NOR ZANU IS YET CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE TERRITORIAL CONTROL OVER ANY SIGNIFICANT PART OF RHODESIA. STILL, THE REPEATED PROMISES OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SUGGEST THAT CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL MAY BEGIN ACCOMPANYING GUERRILLA UNITS INTO RHODESIA. THIS SORT OF INVOLVEMENT WOULD NOT BE UNPRECEDENTED; IT OCCURRED IN GUINEA-BISSAU AND IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE ANGOLAN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, REPRESENT A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND WOULD INCUR THE RISK OF BRINGING
SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 078940

SOUTH AFRICA INTO THE CONFLICT.

31. FROM THE CUBAN STANDPOINT, THE LATTER DEVELOPMENT MIGHT NOT BE ALTOGETHER UNDESIRABLE SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO DISCREDIT, IF NOT DESTROY, AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE CUBANS ARE NOW CONTEMPLATING DEPLOYMENT OF REGULAR COMBAT UNITS IN RHODESIA, AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE CUBA TO A POSSIBLE HUMILIATING DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF RHODESIAN FORCES, PERHAPS ASSISTED BY SOUTH AFRICA.

32. LOOKING BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, CUBA PROBABLY FEELS FAIRLY SANGUINE ABOUT RHODESIA, WHETHER THERE IS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OR A MILITARY SOLUTION. OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, THE CUBANS MIGHT WELL PREFER THE LATTER SINCE IT WOULD ESTABLISH ZAPU'S SUPREMACY OVER RIVAL NATIONALIST LEADERS AND COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT CUBAN/SOVIET ASSISTANCE, THEREBY LAYING THE BASIS FOR FURTHER INFLUENCE OVER THE NEW REGIME. THE CUBANS PROBABLY

ARE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MILITARY EFFORT

WITH ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, TRAINING, AND EVEN
SELECTED PERSONNEL -- UP TO A POINT; BUT IT IS UNLIKELY
THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT A MAJOR TROOP COMMITMENT,
PARTICULARLY AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN TIED DOWN IN
ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

33. CUBA WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO ENDORSE A DEAL
BETWEEN SMITH AND THE NATIONALISTS WHICH INCLUDED
ZAPU AND NKOMO, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NKOMO WOULD
EVENTUALLY DOMINATE A BLACK MAJORITY REGIME UNDER
ANY ARRANGEMENT HE WOULD ACCEPT. CUBA CANNOT,
HOWEVER, ACCEPT AN ACCOMMODATION EXCLUDING NKOMO
OR PLACING HIM AT A DISADVANTAGE. THE CUBANS
UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR NKOMO
SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 078940

HAS PLACED HIM SUFFICIENTLY IN THEIR DEBT TO INSURE
CONTINUING INFLUENCE, AND IN ANY CASE, THEY PROBABLY
FEEL THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DEVELOP GOOD, IF NOT
CLOSE, RELATIONS WITH OTHER BLACK NATIONALIST LEADERS
AS THEY HAVE DONE ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. IT IS UNLIKELY,
HOWEVER, THAT HAVANA WILL PRESS NKOMO TO SEEK A
SETTLEMENT, AND THE CUBANS MAY WELL ADVISE HIM FIRST
TO ESTABLISH ZAPU AS A CREDIBLE MILITARY FORCE BY
CARRYING OUT SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS INSIDE RHODESIA IN
THE NEAR FUTURE.

34. THE NEED TO DO SO MAY NOW APPEAR MORE PRESSING
IN VIEW OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT
INVOLVING SMITH, MUZOREWA, AND SITHOLE. NKOMO,
PREDICTABLY, HAS DENOUNCED THE AGREEMENT AS A SELL-OUT,
AND IT IS UNLIKELY TO GAIN SUPPORT FROM THE FRONT LINE
PRESIDENTS.

35. THUS THE CUBANS WOULD HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE DIPLOMATI-
CALLY IN SUPPORTING A ZAPU OFFENSIVE AGAINST A ZIMBABWEAN
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, EVEN ONE THAT IS PREDOMINANTLY
BLACK. TACTICALLY IT WOULD MAKE SENSE, WHETHER NKOMO'S
OBJECTIVE IS TO FORCE SMITH TO INCLUDE ZAPU IN A MORE
FORTHCOMING SETTLEMENT OR TO OBTAIN AN EVENTUAL
MILITARY VICTORY. AN INTENSIFIED GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN
COULD ALSO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT TO DEMONSTRATE POPULAR SUPPORT IF RHODESIAN
BLACKS ARE INTIMIDATED FROM COOPERATING WITH THE NEW
GOVERNMENT EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF PARTICIPATING IN
ELECTIONS.

CONCLUSION

SECRET

PAGE 15 STATE 078940

36. CUBA'S AFRICAN POLICY IS AT ONCE PRINCIPLED AND OPPORTUNISTIC. CASTRO HAS MADE NO SECRET OF HIS INTENTION TO SUPPORT BLACK NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS AGAINST WHITE MINORITY REGIMES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH NON-ALIGNED AND LEFT-LEANING GOVERNMENTS. HE INSISTS THAT IT IS NOT ONLY CUBA'S SOVEREIGN RIGHT BUT ALSO ITS DUTY TO "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" IN AFRICA.

37. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEVEL OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IS GUIDED BY A PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF RISKS VS. OPPORTUNITIES. THUS THE CUBANS ARE PROVIDING TRAINING AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO SWAPO AND ON A SMALLER SCALE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANC, BUT THEY HAVE SO FAR REFRAINED FROM DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN EITHER NAMIBIA OR SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER THE HAZARDS TOO GREAT AND THE POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION TOO UNCERTAIN.

38. CUBA'S AFRICAN ACTIVITIES IN SYMBIOSIS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE ENABLED CASTRO TO PLAY THE PROMINENT INTERNATIONAL ROLE HE HAS LONG COVETED BUT WHICH UNTIL RECENTLY HAS ELUDED HIM. HE CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT THE POLITICAL GAINS FAR OUTWEIGH THE COST, AND HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT SELECTIVELY OTHER OPENINGS FOR EXPANDING CUBAN INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AND THE THIRD WORLD. END TEXT.

VANCE

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 078940
ORIGIN IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /015 R

66011

DRAFTED BY IO/UNA:BJSHARP

APPROVED BY IO/UNA:AFHOLLOWAY

-----017873 290332Z /66

O 290301Z MAR 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LAGOS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 078940

FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOL RPT STATE 078940 ACTION USNATO INFO HAVANA BONN LONDON
PARIS ROME MOSCOW 28 MAR 78 QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 078940

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PORG, XA, CU, UR

SUBJECT: POLADS SPECIAL PROJECTS -- SOVIET AND CUBAN
MILITARY PENETRATION IN AFRICA

REF: A) STATE 61698 (NOTAL); B) USNATO 1563 (NOTAL)

FOLLOWING ANALYSIS PROVIDED FOR MISSION'S USE IN
CONNECTION WITH ONGOING POLADS EXCHANGE ON SUBJECT. YOU
MAY DRAW AS APPROPRIATE UPON PAPER DURING MARCH 28 AND
SUBSEQUENT POLADS MEETINGS TO ORALLY BRIEF ALLIED DELS
ON US ASSESSMENT OF CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA. DUE
TO SENSITIVITY OF MATERIAL, WE CANNOT AUTHORIZE
CIRCULATION OF TEXT IN WRITTEN FORM; MISSION MAY,
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 078940

HOWEVER, CIRCULATE AS SUMMARY PARAS 61-66 OF US
CONTRIBUTION TO NATO EXPERTS MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA.

BEGIN TEXT:

CASTRO'S AFRICAN POLICY: STRONG MOTIVATIONS, FEW
RESTRAINTS

1. TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, CASTRO HAS BECOME A HOSTAGE
TO HIS OWN ACTIVISM IN AFRICA. CUBA'S MILITARY INTER-
VENTION IN ANGOLA (WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY HAS GROWN

FAR GREATER AND LASTED MUCH LONGER THAN ANTICIPATED
AT THE OUTSET) HAS CREATED EXPECTATIONS IN AFRICA
THAT CUBA WOULD RESPOND GENEROUSLY TO ALL REQUESTS
FOR MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND THE CUBANS
HAVE ENCOURAGED SUCH EXPECTATIONS THROUGH PRIVATE
TALKS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

2. HAVING PROCLAIMED CUBA THE CHAMPION OF "PROLETARIAN
INTERNATIONALISM" IN AFRICA, CASTRO FINDS IT DIFFICULT
TO RESIST BEING DRAWN FURTHER INTO INVOLVEMENTS IN
DEFENSE OR SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONALIST
MOVEMENTS THAT BEAR THE REQUISITE "REVOLUTIONARY"
CREDENTIALS. REFUSAL TO RESPOND TO ESCALATING PLEAS
FOR ASSISTANCE WOULD RUN COUNTER TO CASTRO'S STRONG
SENSE OF MISSION AND HIS DESIRE TO ESTABLISH CUBA AS
A MAJOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA.

3. WHILE CASTRO IS NOT WHOLLY IMMUNE TO PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS, POTENTIAL RESTRAINING FACTORS ARE WEAK, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT.

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 078940

-- SOVIET AND CUBAN OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA, WHILE NOT SYNONYMOUS, ARE CLEARLY COMPLEMENTARY, AND THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO UNDERWRITE THE MAJOR COSTS OF CUBAN COMMITMENTS IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

-- WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, AFRICAN LEADERS HAVE NOT OBJECTED PUBLICLY TO THE GROWING CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA, AND INFLUENTIAL SPOKESMEN SUCH AS TANZANIA'S NYERERE AND ZAMBIA'S KAUNDA CONTINUE TO ACQUIESCE IN AN EXPANDING CUBAN ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- THE CUBANS HAVE YET TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR MILITARY SETBACK; EXCEPT FOR A FEW ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE BRIEF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA IN 1975, THEY HAVE BEEN FIGHTING AGAINST POORLY TRAINED AND ILL-EQUIPPED FORCES WHICH CAN INFLICT FREQUENT CASUALTIES BUT ARE UNABLE TO MOUNT AN OFFENSIVE THAT WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF CUBA'S MILITARY PRESENCE.

-- IN BOTH ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA THERE IS A HEAVY MATERIEL ADVANTAGE IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET/CUBAN-SPONSORED FORCES. A CHANGE IN THE BALANCE IN RHODESIA MAY BE SOMEWHAT MORE DISTANT, BUT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE NKOMO AS MUCH MATERIEL AS HIS FORCES CAN ABSORB.

4. AFRICAN MISGIVINGS ABOUT AN INCREASING CUBAN PRESENCE MAY GROW STRONGER, PARTICULARLY IF CUBA IS INCREASINGLY PERCEIVED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY. BUT THE SITUATIONS IN WHICH CUBA HAS TAKEN OR IS LIKELY TO ASSUME A COMBAT ROLE PLACE CUBA LARGELY ON THE SIDE OF PRINCIPLES THAT ARE WIDELY SUPPORTED IN AFRICA (SANCTITY OF EXISTING BORDERS, BLACK MAJORITY RULE, OPPOSITION TO SOUTH AFRICA) AND THUS PROVIDE OSTENSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CUBA'S ACTIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 078940

5. CUBA HAS FOUND ITSELF ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE FENCE FROM MOST ARAB COUNTRIES OVER ETHIOPIA, AND CASTRO'S INTEREST IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT IN THE HORN PROBABLY STEMS IN LARGE PART FROM HIS DESIRE TO AVOID A SPLIT WITH ARAB SUPPORTERS OF ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE GROUPS AND SOMALIA. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE

CUBANS REALIZE THAT THEIR AGGRESSIVE AFRICAN POLICY COULD BECOME A DIVISIVE ISSUE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM), AND THEY ARE LOBBYING TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF MODERATE OPPOSITION TO THEIR ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE 1979 NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN HAVANA.

6. THE LEADING NON-ALIGNED MODERATES ARE ALSO CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING UNITY WITHIN THE NAM, HOWEVER, AND DO NOT YET APPEAR INCLINED TO ORGANIZE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE BASED ON CUBA'S AFRICAN ACTIVITIES OR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT GIVES LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT ANTI-CUBAN OPPOSITION WILL DEVELOP. MOREOVER, GIVEN CUBA'S DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE RADICAL CHARACTER OF THE NAM, CASTRO WOULD NOT BE PARTICULARLY DISTRESSED IF A FEW PRO-WESTERN MEMBERS DECIDED TO BOYCOTT NEXT YEAR'S SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN HAVANA.

7. WHILE AFRICAN AND/OR ARAB PRESSURES COULD HAVE SOME MARGINAL IMPACT ON CUBAN DECISIONS, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BECOME INTENSE ENOUGH TO INDUCE CUBA TO REMOVE ITS COMBAT FORCES FROM ANGOLA OR ETHIOPIA OR TO REFRAIN FROM INCREASING THEM IF THE MILITARY SITUATION REQUIRES IT.

COUNTRY DISCUSSIONS

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 078940

8. ANGOLA. THE CUBANS' HEAVIEST INVOLVEMENT REMAINS IN ANGOLA. THE EUPHORIA OF CUBA'S EARLY VICTORIES IS

LARGELY GONE AS THE CUBANS TRY TO REBUILD ANGOLA'S ECONOMY, IMPOSE SOME ORDER ON THE MPLA'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY, AND CONTROL STRONGLY-ROOTED INSURGENCIES BY RIVAL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS. CASTRO HAS INVESTED MUCH OF HIS PRESTIGE, AS WELL AS CUBAN HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES, IN MAKING THE MPLA A SUCCESS, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NETO GOVERNMENT STILL CANNOT MAINTAIN ITS HOLD WITHOUT VERY SIZEABLE CUBAN MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

9. NETO'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER BASED ON CUBAN AND SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION INITIALLY PRODUCED A SPLIT WITHIN THE OAU OVER WHETHER THE MPLA SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. GENERAL AFRICAN RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA CAME GRADUALLY (AND IN SOME CASES, GRUDGINGLY) IN REACTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ILL-TIMED INTERVENTION AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS A PRAGMATIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CUBA'S APPARENT DEFEAT OF THE MPLA'S RIVALS.

10. AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ARE RELUCTANT TO CRITICIZE
THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA OPENLY FOR VARIOUS
REASONS:

-- THOSE WHO ARE FRIENDS OF UNITA ARE DEFENSIVE ABOUT
UNITA'S SUSPECTED SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT.

-- OAU GOVERNMENTS OF ALL PERSUASIONS ARE LEERY OF
CHALLENGING THE RIGHTS OF MEMBER STATES TO SEEK
OUTSIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

-- ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION
SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 078940

MOVEMENTS WANT TO RETAIN THE OPTION OF ENLISTING CUBAN
MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

11. THE NETO GOVERNMENT IS STILL WIDELY PERCEIVED,
HOWEVER, AS A CUBAN/SOVIET CLIENT, IF NOT PUPPET, AND
CONTINUING AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT
DEPENDS TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE ON MAINTAINING AN
AURA OF CUBAN SUCCESS AND INVINCIBILITY. IF THE MPLA
REGIME WERE TO COLLAPSE BECAUSE HAVANA WITHDREW THE
SUPPORT NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN IT, THE CUBANS WOULD BE
SEEN BY AFRICANS AND OTHERS AS UNRELIABLE.

12. THUS IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR CASTRO
TO REMOVE OR SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE CUBA'S MILITARY
PRESENCE IN ANGOLA. MOREOVER, DESPITE THE HUMAN COST

OF THE MILITARY EFFORT AND THE DISRUPTIONS IT HAS
CAUSED IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY, CASTRO PROBABLY SEES NO
COMPELLING REASON TO DO SO AT PRESENT. IF THE
CUBAN/MPLA FORCES CAN SUCCEED IN SUPPRESSING UNITA,
FNLA, AND FLEC INSURGENCIES AND GUARANTEE EFFECTIVE
MPLA CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY, THE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT
CAN BE PORTRAYED BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD AS A SIGNAL
TRIUMPH OVER THE FORCES OF "WESTERN IMPERIALISM."
A SUCCESSFUL DENOUEMENT IN ANGOLA WOULD HELP SECURE
CUBA A POSITION AS PRIMUS INTER PARES IN THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT AND PERHAPS ENHANCE CASTRO'S LEVERAGE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION.

13. CONVERSELY, A PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA
UNDER PRESSURE (WHETHER MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC) THAT
WOULD HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF DEFEAT WOULD SUBSTANTIALY
DIMINISH CASTRO'S INTERNATIONAL STATURE. IT COULD ALSO
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 078940

ADVERSELY AFFECT HIS PERSONAL PRIMACY OVER THE CUBAN

GOVERNMENT AND PARTY BY STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF ELEMENTS WHO FAVOR A MORE CAUTIOUS FOREIGN POLICY.

14. WHILE THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH, THE PRESENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA IS AT LEAST TOLERABLE, AND CUBA IS TOO HEAVILY COMMITTED TO BACK OUT NOW. DESPITE TENTATIVE INDICATIONS THAT SOME CUBAN OFFICIALS ARE BEGINNING TO FEAR THAT CUBA IS OVEREXTENDING ITSELF IN AFRICA, CASTRO AND HIS IMMEDIATE CIRCLE OF ADVISERS GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF HAVING A "LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL" SYNDROME, WHICH IS REINFORCED -- IF NOT ENGENDERED -- BY THEIR IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION THAT THE FORCES OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM WILL INEVITABLY TRIUMPH.

15. THERE SEEMS LITTLE BASIS IN THE ANGOLAN SITUATION FOR SUCH OPTIMISM FROM THE CUBAN STANDPOINT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EITHER THE MPLA OR ITS OPPONENTS -- SINGLY OR IN CONCERT -- WILL BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT MILITARILY. THOUGH THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT MAY BE ACHIEVING SOME SUCCESS IN CABINDA AND THE NORTH, THE UNITA INSURGENCY IN THE SOUTH APPEARS CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING A PROLONGED AND INTENSIFIED MPLA/CUBAN OFFENSIVE.

16. IN THE SHORT RUN, CUBA WILL PROBABLY BE WILLING TO DISPATCH ADDITIONAL MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN ADVISERS IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDEEM THE INVESTMENT IT HAS

ALREADY MADE, BUT A CONTINUING MILITARY STALEMATE COUPLED WITH FURTHER POLITICAL TURMOIL WITHIN THE MPLA MIGHT WELL EVENTUALLY DAMPEN CUBA'S ARDOR FOR MAINTAINING A LARGE MILITARY FORCE IN ANGOLA. THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE CUBAN TROOPS IS LIKELY TO DEPEND MUCH LESS ON EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON CUBA THAN ON INTERNAL
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 078940

DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN ANGOLA, PARTICULARLY REGARDING SOME SORT OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE MPLA AND ITS RIVALS. SUCH A SOLUTION MAY BECOME INCREASINGLY ATTRACTIVE TO HAVANA AS TIME GOES ON, BUT THAT TIME IS NOT YET.

17. ETHIOPIA. CUBA'S COMMITMENT IN ETHIOPIA IS BASED LARGELY ON CASTRO'S HIGH REGARD FOR MENGISTU AS A GENUINE MARXIST-LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT A RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF ETHIOPIAN SOCIETY THAT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS PARALLELS CUBA'S EXPERIENCE. CASTRO'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO ASSURE THE VIABILITY OF THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME, AND HE NOW APPARENTLY FEELS THAT THIS GOAL CANNOT BE ATTAINED UNTIL ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY SITUATION IS SECURE.

18. AS IN ANGOLA, THE CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA HAS EXPANDED FAR BEYOND WHAT WAS PROBABLY ANTICIPATED WHEN THE FIRST CUBAN ADVISERS ARRIVED LAST SPRING. IN THE WAKE OF THE SOMALI CONQUEST OF MOST OF THE OGADEN IN LATE SUMMER AND CONTINUING INSURGENT GAINS IN ERITREA, THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY SITUATION LOOKED INCREASINGLY DESPERATE BY OCTOBER, AND THE MENGISTU REGIME'S STABILITY WAS FURTHER THREATENED BY POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNAL DISSENTION WITHIN THE DERGUE.

19. THE SOMALI DECISION IN NOVEMBER TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH HAVANA AND EXPEL ALL CUBAN AND SOVIET ADVISERS REMOVED THE LAST MAJOR OBSTACLE TO LARGE-SCALE CUBAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA. WITH CLEAR SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT, AS WELL AS MATERIAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA EXPANDED QUICKLY.
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 078940

THE TOTAL IS NOW IN EXCESS OF 13,000, AND RECENT CUBAN STATEMENTS HAVE SHOWN NO SIGN OF WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN WITHDRAWALS.

20. THE CUBAN FORCES APPARENTLY INCLUDE A FULL COMBAT DIVISION OF AT LEAST 7,000 MEN, WHICH HAS PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN THE EASTERN OGADEN, GIVING THE CUBANS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY AND

PERMITTING THEM TO UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS LARGELY INDEPENDENT OF ETHIOPIAN FORCES. MOREOVER, CUBAN PILOTS FLYING ETHIOPIAN MIGS HAVE HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE FIGHTING.

21. CUBAN AND SOVIET OFFICERS HAVE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH ETHIOPIAN OFFICIALS ON MILITARY STRATEGY, THE MAIN POINTS OF WHICH APPEAR TO BE:

-- DEFEAT AND EXPULSION OF SOMALI FORCES FROM THE OGADEN;

-- DEFENSE OF THE PORT OF ASSAB AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE COAST TO ADDIS ABABA; AND

-- REINFORCEMENT AND RETENTION OF REMAINING ETHIOPIAN GARRISON IN ERITREA.

22. THE PROBLEM OF ERITREA IS LIKELY TO PROVE MUCH MORE INTRACTABLE, BUT THE CUBANS MAY CALCULATE THAT THEY CAN PRESERVE A CHANCE FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH ONE OR MORE OF THE ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS THAT WOULD ALLOW

ETHIOPIA TO RETAIN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE REGION UNDER
SOME FORM OF FEDERATION. CUBA'S RECENT COURTSHIP OF
IRAQ -- ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL BACKERS OF THE ERITREAN
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT -- MAY WELL BE RELATED TO THIS
SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 078940

GOAL.

23. WITH THE EXPULSION OF SOMALI TROOPS FROM THE OGADEN,
THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE LITTLE REASON TO INCREASE THE
NUMBER OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ETHIOPIA BEYOND THEIR PRESENT
LEVEL. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY PAYING FOR
MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE PRIMARY COSTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN
OPERATION, THE SECONDARY COSTS CAUSED BY ADDITIONAL
DISRUPTION OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY ON TOP OF THOSE COSTS
ALREADY IMPOSED BY THE LARGER ANGOLAN INVOLVEMENT STILL
REPRESENT AN APPRECIABLE BURDEN FOR CUBA.

24. THE CUBANS THEREFORE MAY BE DISPOSED TO REDUCE
THEIR FORCES IN ETHIOPIA GRADUALLY AS NEWLY TRAINED
AND EQUIPPED ETHIOPIAN UNITS BECAME CAPABLE OF TAKING
OVER THE TASK OF DEFENSE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPER-
ATIONS AGAINST SOMALI GUERRILLAS IN THE OGADEN. THIS
PROCESS PROBABLY WILL REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF SEVERAL
MONTHS, HOWEVER, AND EVEN IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES
A CUBAN MILITARY FORCE OF AT LEAST A FEW THOUSAND IS
LIKELY TO REMAIN IN ETHIOPIA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

25. A NUMBER OF FACTORS COULD ALTER THIS SCENARIO,
HOWEVER, AND MILITATE IN FAVOR OF MAINTAINING A CUBAN
FORCE AT OR NEAR THE PRESENT LEVEL.

-- IF THE SOMALIS BEGIN RECEIVING LARGE-SCALE MILITARY
AID OR, MORE IMPORTANTLY, COMBAT TROOPS FROM SYMPATHETIC
MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD ALMOST
CERTAINLY FEAR RENEWED SOMALI AGGRESSION AND USE THIS AS
A JUSTIFICATION FOR KEEPING A LARGE CUBAN COMBAT FORCE

IN THE AREA (AS IN ANGOLA).

SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 078940

-- IF THE ETHIOPIANS EMBARK ON A MAJOR CAMPAIGN IN
ERITREA, A LARGE CUBAN FORCE MIGHT WELL BE REQUIRED
TO SECURE THE OGADEN AND FREE ETHIOPIAN UNITS FOR
SERVICE IN THE NORTH. FOR BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY
REASONS, THE CUBANS PROBABLY WOULD PREFER TO LIMIT
THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN ERITREA, BUT THEY MAY FIND THIS
DIFFICULT IF THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT PRESSURES THEM TO
LEND COMBAT ASSISTANCE.

-- IF THE SOMALIS MOUNT AN UNEXPECTEDLY TENACIOUS INSURGENCY IN THE OGADEN, OR IF THE ETHIOPIAN AND/OR CUBAN FORCES CARRY THE FIGHTING INTO SOMALIA, THEREBY PROVOKING FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE CUBANS MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO RAISE THEIR TROOP STRENGTH EVEN HIGHER.

26. EVEN IF THE MILITARY SITUATION PERMITS A PARTIAL DRAW-DOWN OF CUBAN MILITARY FORCES IN ETHIOPIA, THE CUBANS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY REMAIN A STRONG PRESENCE THERE (THOUGH PROBABLY NOT AS PERVASIVE AS IN ANGOLA). THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TECHNICAL AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL IS LIKELY TO INCREASE, AND CUBAN POLITICAL CADRES WILL PROBABLY ASSIST IN SETTING UP MASS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS USING CUBAN MODELS.

27. RHODESIA. THE INSURGENCY AGAINST SMITH'S REGIME PRESENTS THE CUBANS WITH BOTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS. CHIEF AMONG THE LATTER HAS BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ELIMINATE ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND DEVELOP A FIGHTING FORCE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT PUNISHING STRIKES WITHIN RHODESIA. MUGABE'S MOZAMBIQUE-BASED ZANU FORCES HAVE NOT PROVED VERY EFFECTIVE AS GUERRILLAS AND HAVE BEEN SEVERELY HURT BY RHODESIAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.

SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 078940

28. THE CUBANS NOW SEEM TO HAVE THROWN THEIR SUPPORT TO ZAPU AND NKOMO, WHO APPEARS MUCH MORE CREDIBLE AS A POLITICAL LEADER, EVEN IF HIS ALLEGIANCE TO HIS SOVIET AND CUBAN SPONSORS IS TO A GREAT EXTENT OPPORTUNISTIC.

29. DESPITE THESE TIES, CUBAN COOPERATION WITH ZAPU IS CONSTRAINED BY KAUNDA'S RESIDUAL MISTRUST OF HAVANA'S INTENTIONS AND HIS RELUCTANCE TO PERMIT LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ZAMBIA. KAUNDA MAY WELL FEAR THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CUBAN PRESENCE IN ZAMBIA WOULD ENCOURAGE INTENSIFICATION OF RHODESIAN RAIDS ON ZAMBIA, AS HAS OCCURRED IN MOZAMBIQUE, AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME DEPENDENT ON CUBAN FORCES FOR DEFENSE. ZAPU HAS YET TO PROVE ITSELF AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE, AND ZAMBIA'S ZAMBEZI RIVER BORDER WITH RHODESIA HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE TO MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS INTO RHODESIA.

30. IT IS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT NEITHER ZAPU NOR ZANU IS YET CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE TERRITORIAL CONTROL OVER ANY SIGNIFICANT PART OF RHODESIA. STILL, THE REPEATED PROMISES OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SUGGEST THAT CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL MAY BEGIN ACCOMPANYING GUERRILLA UNITS INTO RHODESIA.

THIS SORT OF INVOLVEMENT WOULD NOT BE UNPRECEDENTED; IT OCCURRED IN GUINEA-BISSAU AND IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE ANGOLAN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, REPRESENT A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND WOULD INCUR THE RISK OF BRINGING SOUTH AFRICA INTO THE CONFLICT.

31. FROM THE CUBAN STANDPOINT, THE LATTER DEVELOPMENT
SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 078940

MIGHT NOT BE ALTOGETHER UNDESIRABLE SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO DISCREDIT, IF NOT DESTROY, AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE CUBANS ARE NOW CONTEMPLATING DEPLOYMENT OF REGULAR COMBAT UNITS IN RHODESIA, AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE CUBA TO A POSSIBLE HUMILIATING DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF RHODESIAN FORCES, PERHAPS ASSISTED BY SOUTH AFRICA.

32. LOOKING BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, CUBA PROBABLY FEELS FAIRLY SANGUINE ABOUT RHODESIA, WHETHER THERE IS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OR A MILITARY SOLUTION. OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, THE CUBANS MIGHT WELL PREFER THE LATTER SINCE IT WOULD ESTABLISH ZAPU'S SUPREMACY OVER RIVAL NATIONALIST LEADERS AND COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT CUBAN/SOVIET ASSISTANCE, THEREBY LAYING THE BASIS FOR FURTHER INFLUENCE OVER THE NEW REGIME. THE CUBANS PROBABLY ARE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MILITARY EFFORT

WITH ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, TRAINING, AND EVEN SELECTED PERSONNEL -- UP TO A POINT; BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT A MAJOR TROOP COMMITMENT, PARTICULARLY AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN TIED DOWN IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

33. CUBA WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO ENDORSE A DEAL BETWEEN SMITH AND THE NATIONALISTS WHICH INCLUDED ZAPU AND NKOMO, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NKOMO WOULD EVENTUALLY DOMINATE A BLACK MAJORITY REGIME UNDER ANY ARRANGEMENT HE WOULD ACCEPT. CUBA CANNOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT AN ACCOMMODATION EXCLUDING NKOMO OR PLACING HIM AT A DISADVANTAGE. THE CUBANS UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR NKOMO HAS PLACED HIM SUFFICIENTLY IN THEIR DEBT TO INSURE CONTINUING INFLUENCE, AND IN ANY CASE, THEY PROBABLY FEEL THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DEVELOP GOOD, IF NOT
SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 078940

CLOSE, RELATIONS WITH OTHER BLACK NATIONALIST LEADERS

AS THEY HAVE DONE ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT HAVANA WILL PRESS NKOMO TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT, AND THE CUBANS MAY WELL ADVISE HIM FIRST TO ESTABLISH ZAPU AS A CREDIBLE MILITARY FORCE BY CARRYING OUT SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS INSIDE RHODESIA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

34. THE NEED TO DO SO MAY NOW APPEAR MORE PRESSING IN VIEW OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT INVOLVING SMITH, MUZOREWA, AND SITHOLE. NKOMO, PREDICTABLY, HAS DENOUNCED THE AGREEMENT AS A SELL-OUT, AND IT IS UNLIKELY TO GAIN SUPPORT FROM THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS.

35. THUS THE CUBANS WOULD HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE DIPLOMATICALLY IN SUPPORTING A ZAPU OFFENSIVE AGAINST A ZIMBABWEAN TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, EVEN ONE THAT IS PREDOMINANTLY BLACK. TACTICALLY IT WOULD MAKE SENSE, WHETHER NKOMO'S OBJECTIVE IS TO FORCE SMITH TO INCLUDE ZAPU IN A MORE FORTHCOMING SETTLEMENT OR TO OBTAIN AN EVENTUAL MILITARY VICTORY. AN INTENSIFIED GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN COULD ALSO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO DEMONSTRATE POPULAR SUPPORT IF RHODESIAN BLACKS ARE INTIMIDATED FROM COOPERATING WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF PARTICIPATING IN ELECTIONS.

CONCLUSION

36. CUBA'S AFRICAN POLICY IS AT ONCE PRINCIPLED AND OPPORTUNISTIC. CASTRO HAS MADE NO SECRET OF HIS INTENTION TO SUPPORT BLACK NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS
SECRET

PAGE 15 STATE 078940

AGAINST WHITE MINORITY REGIMES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH NON-ALIGNED AND LEFT-LEANING GOVERNMENTS. HE INSISTS THAT IT IS NOT ONLY CUBA'S SOVEREIGN RIGHT BUT ALSO ITS DUTY TO "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" IN AFRICA.

37. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEVEL OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IS GUIDED BY A PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF RISKS VS. OPPORTUNITIES. THUS THE CUBANS ARE PROVIDING TRAINING AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO SWAPO AND ON A SMALLER SCALE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANC, BUT THEY HAVE SO FAR REFRAINED FROM DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN EITHER NAMIBIA OR SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER THE HAZARDS TOO GREAT AND THE POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION TOO UNCERTAIN.

38. CUBA'S AFRICAN ACTIVITIES IN SYMBIOSIS WITH THE

SOVIET UNION HAVE ENABLED CASTRO TO PLAY THE PROMINENT INTERNATIONAL ROLE HE HAS LONG COVETED BUT WHICH UNTIL RECENTLY HAS ELUDED HIM. HE CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT THE POLITICAL GAINS FAR OUTWEIGH THE COST, AND HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT SELECTIVELY OTHER OPENINGS FOR EXPANDING CUBAN INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AND THE THIRD WORLD. END TEXT.

VANCE

UNQUOTE COOPER

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 078940
ORIGIN ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /015 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:ARA/CCA:WSSMITH:DHB

APPROVED BY:ARA:JBUSHNELL

-----057876 311735Z /41

R 310840Z MAR 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL AMERICAN REPUBLIC DIPLOMATIC POSTS

S E C R E T STATE 078940

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 078940 SENT ACTION LAGOS MAR 29.

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 078940

FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOL RPT STATE 078940 ACTION USNATO INFO HAVANA BONN LONDON
PARIS ROME MOSCOW 28 MAR 78 QUOTE

S E C R E T STATE 078940

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: NATO, PORG, XA, CU, UR

SUBJECT: POLADS SPECIAL PROJECTS -- SOVIET AND CUBAN
MILITARY PENETRATION IN AFRICA

REF: A) STATE 61698 (NOTAL); B) USNATO 1563 (NOTAL)

FOLLOWING ANALYSIS PROVIDED FOR MISSION'S USE IN
CONNECTION WITH ONGOING POLADS EXCHANGE ON SUBJECT. YOU
MAY DRAW AS APPROPRIATE UPON PAPER DURING MARCH 28 AND
SUBSEQUENT POLADS MEETINGS TO ORALLY BRIEF ALLIED DELS
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 078940

ON US ASSESSMENT OF CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA. DUE TO SENSITIVITY OF MATERIAL, WE CANNOT AUTHORIZE CIRCULATION OF TEXT IN WRITTEN FORM; MISSION MAY, HOWEVER, CIRCULATE AS SUMMARY PARAS 61-66 OF US CONTRIBUTION TO NATO EXPERTS MEETING ON LATIN AMERICA.

BEGIN TEXT:

CASTRO'S AFRICAN POLICY: STRONG MOTIVATIONS, FEW RESTRAINTS

1. TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, CASTRO HAS BECOME A HOSTAGE TO HIS OWN ACTIVISM IN AFRICA. CUBA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA (WHICH ALMOST CERTAINLY HAS GROWN

FAR GREATER AND LASTED MUCH LONGER THAN ANTICIPATED AT THE OUTSET) HAS CREATED EXPECTATIONS IN AFRICA THAT CUBA WOULD RESPOND GENEROUSLY TO ALL REQUESTS FOR MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND THE CUBANS HAVE ENCOURAGED SUCH EXPECTATIONS THROUGH PRIVATE TALKS AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS.

2. HAVING PROCLAIMED CUBA THE CHAMPION OF "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" IN AFRICA, CASTRO FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO RESIST BEING DRAWN FURTHER INTO INVOLVEMENTS IN DEFENSE OR SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENTS AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS THAT BEAR THE REQUISITE "REVOLUTIONARY" CREDENTIALS. REFUSAL TO RESPOND TO ESCALATING PLEAS FOR ASSISTANCE WOULD RUN COUNTER TO CASTRO'S STRONG SENSE OF MISSION AND HIS DESIRE TO ESTABLISH CUBA AS A MAJOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA.

3. WHILE CASTRO IS NOT WHOLLY IMMUNE TO PRAGMATIC
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 078940

CONSIDERATIONS, POTENTIAL RESTRAINING FACTORS ARE WEAK, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT.

-- SOVIET AND CUBAN OBJECTIVES IN AFRICA, WHILE NOT SYNONYMOUS, ARE CLEARLY COMPLEMENTARY, AND THE SOVIETS ARE WILLING TO UNDERWRITE THE MAJOR COSTS OF CUBAN COMMITMENTS IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

-- WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, AFRICAN LEADERS HAVE NOT OBJECTED PUBLICLY TO THE GROWING CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA, AND INFLUENTIAL SPOKESMEN SUCH AS TANZANIA'S NYERERE AND ZAMBIA'S KAUNDA CONTINUE TO ACQUIESCE IN AN EXPANDING CUBAN ROLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

-- THE CUBANS HAVE YET TO EXPERIENCE A MAJOR MILITARY SETBACK; EXCEPT FOR A FEW ENGAGEMENTS DURING THE BRIEF SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA IN 1975, THEY HAVE BEEN FIGHTING AGAINST POORLY TRAINED AND ILL-EQUIPPED FORCES WHICH CAN INFLICT FREQUENT CASUALTIES BUT ARE UNABLE TO MOUNT AN OFFENSIVE THAT WOULD FUNDAMENTALLY THREATEN THE VIABILITY OF CUBA'S MILITARY PRESENCE.

-- IN BOTH ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA THERE IS A HEAVY MATERIEL ADVANTAGE IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET/CUBAN-SPONSORED FORCES. A CHANGE IN THE BALANCE IN RHODESIA MAY BE SOMEWHAT MORE DISTANT, BUT THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE PREPARED TO GIVE NKOMO AS MUCH MATERIEL AS HIS FORCES CAN ABSORB.

4. AFRICAN MISGIVINGS ABOUT AN INCREASING CUBAN PRESENCE MAY GROW STRONGER, PARTICULARLY IF CUBA IS INCREASINGLY PERCEIVED AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET POLICY. BUT THE SITUATIONS IN WHICH CUBA HAS TAKEN OR IS LIKELY TO ASSUME A COMBAT ROLE PLACE CUBA LARGELY ON THE SIDE OF PRINCIPLES THAT ARE WIDELY SUPPORTED IN AFRICA (SANCTITY OF EXISTING BORDERS, BLACK SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 078940

MAJORITY RULE, OPPOSITION TO SOUTH AFRICA) AND THUS PROVIDE OSTENSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR CUBA'S ACTIONS.

5. CUBA HAS FOUND ITSELF ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE FENCE FROM MOST ARAB COUNTRIES OVER ETHIOPIA, AND CASTRO'S INTEREST IN PROMOTING A SETTLEMENT IN THE HORN PROBABLY STEMS IN LARGE PART FROM HIS DESIRE TO AVOID A SPLIT WITH ARAB SUPPORTERS OF ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE GROUPS AND SOMALIA. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CUBANS REALIZE THAT THEIR AGGRESSIVE AFRICAN POLICY COULD BECOME A DIVISIVE ISSUE IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM), AND THEY ARE LOBBYING TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF MODERATE OPPOSITION TO THEIR ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE 1979 NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN HAVANA.

6. THE LEADING NON-ALIGNED MODERATES ARE ALSO CONCERNED WITH MAINTAINING UNITY WITHIN THE NAM, HOWEVER, AND DO NOT YET APPEAR INCLINED TO ORGANIZE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE BASED ON CUBA'S AFRICAN ACTIVITIES OR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT GIVES LITTLE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY SIGNIFICANT ANTI-CUBAN OPPOSITION WILL DEVELOP. MOREOVER, GIVEN CUBA'S DESIRE TO PRESERVE THE RADICAL CHARACTER OF THE NAM, CASTRO WOULD NOT BE PARTICULARLY DISTRESSED IF A FEW PRO-WESTERN MEMBERS DECIDED TO BOYCOTT NEXT YEAR'S SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN HAVANA.

7. WHILE AFRICAN AND/OR ARAB PRESSURES COULD HAVE SOME MARGINAL IMPACT ON CUBAN DECISIONS, THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BECOME INTENSE ENOUGH TO INDUCE CUBA TO REMOVE ITS COMBAT FORCES FROM ANGOLA OR ETHIOPIA OR TO REFRAIN FROM INCREASING THEM IF THE MILITARY SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 078940

SITUATION REQUIRES IT.

COUNTRY DISCUSSIONS

8. ANGOLA. THE CUBANS' HEAVIEST INVOLVEMENT REMAINS IN ANGOLA. THE EUPHORIA OF CUBA'S EARLY VICTORIES IS

LARGELY GONE AS THE CUBANS TRY TO REBUILD ANGOLA'S ECONOMY, IMPOSE SOME ORDER ON THE MPLA'S ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY, AND CONTROL STRONGLY-ROOTED INSURGENCIES BY RIVAL INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS. CASTRO HAS INVESTED MUCH OF HIS PRESTIGE, AS WELL AS CUBAN HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES, IN MAKING THE MPLA A SUCCESS, BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE NETO GOVERNMENT STILL CANNOT MAINTAIN ITS HOLD WITHOUT VERY SIZEABLE CUBAN MILITARY AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

9. NETO'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER BASED ON CUBAN AND SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION INITIALLY PRODUCED A SPLIT WITHIN THE OAU OVER WHETHER THE MPLA SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. GENERAL AFRICAN RECOGNITION OF THE MPLA CAME GRADUALLY (AND IN SOME CASES, GRUDGINGLY) IN REACTION TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ILL-TIMED INTERVENTION AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, AS A PRAGMATIC ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CUBA'S APPARENT DEFEAT OF THE MPLA'S RIVALS.

10. AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS ARE RELUCTANT TO CRITICIZE THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA OPENLY FOR VARIOUS REASONS:

-- THOSE WHO ARE FRIENDS OF UNITA ARE DEFENSIVE ABOUT UNITA'S SUSPECTED SOUTH AFRICAN SUPPORT.

-- OAU GOVERNMENTS OF ALL PERSUASIONS ARE LEERY OF CHALLENGING THE RIGHTS OF MEMBER STATES TO SEEK SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 078940

OUTSIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE.

-- ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WANT TO RETAIN THE OPTION OF ENLISTING CUBAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

11. THE NETO GOVERNMENT IS STILL WIDELY PERCEIVED, HOWEVER, AS A CUBAN/SOVIET CLIENT, IF NOT PUPPET, AND CONTINUING AFRICAN ACCEPTANCE OF CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT DEPENDS TO A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE ON MAINTAINING AN AURA OF CUBAN SUCCESS AND INVINCIBILITY. IF THE MPLA REGIME WERE TO COLLAPSE BECAUSE HAVANA WITHDREW THE SUPPORT NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN IT, THE CUBANS WOULD BE SEEN BY AFRICANS AND OTHERS AS UNRELIABLE.

12. THUS IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR CASTRO TO REMOVE OR SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE CUBA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN ANGOLA. MOREOVER, DESPITE THE HUMAN COST

OF THE MILITARY EFFORT AND THE DISRUPTIONS IT HAS CAUSED IN THE CUBAN ECONOMY, CASTRO PROBABLY SEES NO COMPELLING REASON TO DO SO AT PRESENT. IF THE CUBAN/MPLA FORCES CAN SUCCEED IN SUPPRESSING UNITA, FNLA, AND FLEC INSURGENCIES AND GUARANTEE EFFECTIVE MPLA CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY, THE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT CAN BE PORTRAYED BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD AS A SIGNAL TRIUMPH OVER THE FORCES OF "WESTERN IMPERIALISM." A SUCCESSFUL DENOUEMENT IN ANGOLA WOULD HELP SECURE CUBA A POSITION AS PRIMUS INTER PARES IN THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT AND PERHAPS ENHANCE CASTRO'S LEVERAGE WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

13. CONVERSELY, A PREMATURE WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 078940

UNDER PRESSURE (WHETHER MILITARY OR DIPLOMATIC) THAT WOULD HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF DEFEAT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY DIMINISH CASTRO'S INTERNATIONAL STATURE. IT COULD ALSO ADVERSELY AFFECT HIS PERSONAL PRIMACY OVER THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY BY STRENGTHENING THE POSITION OF ELEMENTS WHO FAVOR A MORE CAUTIOUS FOREIGN POLICY.

14. WHILE THE STAKES ARE VERY HIGH, THE PRESENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA IS AT LEAST TOLERABLE, AND CUBA IS TOO HEAVILY COMMITTED TO BACK OUT NOW. DESPITE TENTATIVE INDICATIONS THAT SOME CUBAN OFFICIALS ARE BEGINNING TO FEAR THAT CUBA IS OVEREXTENDING ITSELF IN AFRICA, CASTRO AND HIS IMMEDIATE CIRCLE OF ADVISERS GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF HAVING A "LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL" SYNDROME, WHICH IS REINFORCED -- IF NOT ENGENDERED -- BY THEIR IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION THAT THE FORCES OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM WILL INEVITABLY TRIUMPH.

15. THERE SEEMS LITTLE BASIS IN THE ANGOLAN SITUATION FOR SUCH OPTIMISM FROM THE CUBAN STANDPOINT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT EITHER THE MPLA OR ITS OPPONENTS -- SINGLY

OR IN CONCERT -- WILL BE ABLE TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT MILITARILY. THOUGH THE LUANDA GOVERNMENT MAY BE ACHIEVING SOME SUCCESS IN CABINDA AND THE NORTH, THE UNITA INSURGENCY IN THE SOUTH APPEARS CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING A PROLONGED AND INTENSIFIED MPLA/CUBAN OFFENSIVE.

16. IN THE SHORT RUN, CUBA WILL PROBABLY BE WILLING TO DISPATCH ADDITIONAL MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN ADVISERS IN AN ATTEMPT TO REDEEM THE INVESTMENT IT HAS

ALREADY MADE, BUT A CONTINUING MILITARY STALEMATE COUPLED WITH FURTHER POLITICAL TURMOIL WITHIN THE MPLA MIGHT WELL EVENTUALLY DAMPEN CUBA'S ARDOR FOR MAINTAINING
SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 078940

A LARGE MILITARY FORCE IN ANGOLA. THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE CUBAN TROOPS IS LIKELY TO DEPEND MUCH LESS ON EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON CUBA THAN ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN ANGOLA, PARTICULARLY REGARDING SOME SORT OF ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE MPLA AND ITS RIVALS. SUCH A SOLUTION MAY BECOME INCREASINGLY ATTRACTIVE TO HAVANA AS TIME GOES ON, BUT THAT TIME IS NOT YET.

17. ETHIOPIA. CUBA'S COMMITMENT IN ETHIOPIA IS BASED LARGELY ON CASTRO'S HIGH REGARD FOR MENGISTU AS A GENUINE MARXIST-LENINIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS ATTEMPTING TO CARRY OUT A RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF ETHIOPIAN SOCIETY THAT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS PARALLELS CUBA'S EXPERIENCE. CASTRO'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IS TO ASSURE THE VIABILITY OF THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME, AND HE NOW APPARENTLY FEELS THAT THIS GOAL CANNOT BE ATTAINED UNTIL ETHIOPIA'S MILITARY SITUATION IS SECURE.

18. AS IN ANGOLA, THE CUBAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN ETHIOPIA HAS EXPANDED FAR BEYOND WHAT WAS PROBABLY ANTICIPATED WHEN THE FIRST CUBAN ADVISERS ARRIVED LAST SPRING. IN THE WAKE OF THE SOMALI CONQUEST OF MOST OF THE OGADEN IN LATE SUMMER AND CONTINUING INSURGENT GAINS IN ERITREA, THE ETHIOPIAN MILITARY SITUATION LOOKED INCREASINGLY DESPERATE BY OCTOBER, AND THE MENGISTU REGIME'S STABILITY WAS FURTHER THREATENED BY POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND INTERNAL DISSENTION WITHIN THE DERGUE.

19. THE SOMALI DECISION IN NOVEMBER TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH HAVANA AND EXPEL ALL CUBAN AND SOVIET ADVISERS REMOVED THE LAST MAJOR OBSTACLE TO LARGE-SCALE CUBAN
SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 078940

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA. WITH CLEAR SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT, AS WELL AS MATERIAL AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT, THE CUBAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA EXPANDED QUICKLY. THE TOTAL IS NOW IN EXCESS OF 13,000, AND RECENT CUBAN STATEMENTS HAVE SHOWN NO SIGN OF WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN WITHDRAWALS.

20. THE CUBAN FORCES APPARENTLY INCLUDE A FULL COMBAT DIVISION OF AT LEAST 7,000 MEN, WHICH HAS PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN THE COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN THE EASTERN OGADEN, GIVING THE CUBANS TACTICAL FLEXIBILITY AND

PERMITTING THEM TO UNDERTAKE OPERATIONS LARGELY INDEPENDENT OF ETHIOPIAN FORCES. MOREOVER, CUBAN PILOTS FLYING ETHIOPIAN MIGS HAVE HAD A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE FIGHTING.

21. CUBAN AND SOVIET OFFICERS HAVE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH ETHIOPIAN OFFICIALS ON MILITARY STRATEGY, THE MAIN POINTS OF WHICH APPEAR TO BE:

-- DEFEAT AND EXPULSION OF SOMALI FORCES FROM THE OGADEN;

-- DEFENSE OF THE PORT OF ASSAB AND MAINTENANCE OF COMMUNICATION AND SUPPLY ROUTES FROM THE COAST TO ADDIS ABABA; AND

-- REINFORCEMENT AND RETENTION OF REMAINING ETHIOPIAN GARRISON IN ERITREA.

22. THE PROBLEM OF ERITREA IS LIKELY TO PROVE MUCH MORE INTRACTABLE, BUT THE CUBANS MAY CALCULATE THAT THEY CAN PRESERVE A CHANCE FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH ONE OR MORE OF THE ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS THAT WOULD ALLOW ETHIOPIA TO RETAIN SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE REGION UNDER
SECRET

PAGE 10 STATE 078940

SOME FORM OF FEDERATION. CUBA'S RECENT COURTSHIP OF IRAQ -- ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL BACKERS OF THE ERITREAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT -- MAY WELL BE RELATED TO THIS GOAL.

23. WITH THE EXPULSION OF SOMALI TROOPS FROM THE OGADEN, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE LITTLE REASON TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ETHIOPIA BEYOND THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS ARE PROBABLY PAYING FOR MOST IF NOT ALL OF THE PRIMARY COSTS OF THE ETHIOPIAN OPERATION, THE SECONDARY COSTS CAUSED BY ADDITIONAL DISRUPTION OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY ON TOP OF THOSE COSTS ALREADY IMPOSED BY THE LARGER ANGOLAN INVOLVEMENT STILL

REPRESENT AN APPRECIABLE BURDEN FOR CUBA.

24. THE CUBANS THEREFORE MAY BE DISPOSED TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN ETHIOPIA GRADUALLY AS NEWLY TRAINED AND EQUIPPED ETHIOPIAN UNITS BECAME CAPABLE OF TAKING OVER THE TASK OF DEFENSE AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY OPERATIONS AGAINST SOMALI GUERRILLAS IN THE OGADEN. THIS PROCESS PROBABLY WILL REQUIRE A MINIMUM OF SEVERAL MONTHS, HOWEVER, AND EVEN IN THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES A CUBAN MILITARY FORCE OF AT LEAST A FEW THOUSAND IS LIKELY TO REMAIN IN ETHIOPIA FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

25. A NUMBER OF FACTORS COULD ALTER THIS SCENARIO, HOWEVER, AND MILITATE IN FAVOR OF MAINTAINING A CUBAN FORCE AT OR NEAR THE PRESENT LEVEL.

-- IF THE SOMALIS BEGIN RECEIVING LARGE-SCALE MILITARY AID OR, MORE IMPORTANTLY, COMBAT TROOPS FROM SYMPATHETIC MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, THE ETHIOPIANS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY FEAR RENEWED SOMALI AGGRESSION AND USE THIS AS
SECRET

PAGE 11 STATE 078940

A JUSTIFICATION FOR KEEPING A LARGE CUBAN COMBAT FORCE
IN THE AREA (AS IN ANGOLA).

-- IF THE ETHIOPIANS EMBARK ON A MAJOR CAMPAIGN IN ERITREA, A LARGE CUBAN FORCE MIGHT WELL BE REQUIRED TO SECURE THE OGADEN AND FREE ETHIOPIAN UNITS FOR SERVICE IN THE NORTH. FOR BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY REASONS, THE CUBANS PROBABLY WOULD PREFER TO LIMIT THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN ERITREA, BUT THEY MAY FIND THIS DIFFICULT IF THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT PRESSURES THEM TO LEND COMBAT ASSISTANCE.

-- IF THE SOMALIS MOUNT AN UNEXPECTEDLY TENACIOUS INSURGENCY IN THE OGADEN, OR IF THE ETHIOPIAN AND/OR CUBAN FORCES CARRY THE FIGHTING INTO SOMALIA, THEREBY PROVOKING FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE CUBANS MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO RAISE THEIR TROOP STRENGTH EVEN HIGHER.

26. EVEN IF THE MILITARY SITUATION PERMITS A PARTIAL DRAW-DOWN OF CUBAN MILITARY FORCES IN ETHIOPIA, THE CUBANS WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY REMAIN A STRONG PRESENCE THERE (THOUGH PROBABLY NOT AS PERVASIVE AS IN ANGOLA). THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TECHNICAL AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL IS LIKELY TO INCREASE, AND CUBAN POLITICAL CADRES WILL PROBABLY ASSIST IN SETTING UP MASS POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS USING CUBAN MODELS.

27. RHODESIA. THE INSURGENCY AGAINST SMITH'S REGIME PRE-

SENTS THE CUBANS WITH BOTH OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS. CHIEF AMONG THE LATTER HAS BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO ELIMINATE ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND DEVELOP A FIGHTING FORCE CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT PUNISHING STRIKES WITHIN RHODESIA. MUGABE'S MOZAMBIQUE-BASED ZANU FORCES HAVE NOT PROVED VERY EFFECTIVE AS GUERRILLAS

SECRET

PAGE 12 STATE 078940

AND HAVE BEEN SEVERELY HURT BY RHODESIAN CROSS-BORDER RAIDS.

28. THE CUBANS NOW SEEM TO HAVE THROWN THEIR SUPPORT TO ZAPU AND NKOMO, WHO APPEARS MUCH MORE CREDIBLE AS A POLITICAL LEADER, EVEN IF HIS ALLEGIANCE TO HIS SOVIET AND CUBAN SPONSORS IS TO A GREAT EXTENT OPPORTUNISTIC.

29. DESPITE THESE TIES, CUBAN COOPERATION WITH ZAPU IS CONSTRAINED BY KAUNDA'S RESIDUAL MISTRUST OF HAVANA'S INTENTIONS AND HIS RELUCTANCE TO PERMIT LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ZAMBIA. KAUNDA MAY WELL FEAR THAT A SUBSTANTIAL CUBAN PRESENCE IN ZAMBIA WOULD ENCOURAGE INTENSIFICATION OF RHODESIAN RAIDS ON ZAMBIA, AS HAS OCCURRED IN MOZAMBIQUE, AND HE DOES NOT WANT TO BECOME DEPENDENT ON CUBAN FORCES FOR DEFENSE. ZAPU HAS YET TO PROVE ITSELF AN EFFECTIVE FIGHTING FORCE, AND ZAMBIA'S ZAMBEZI RIVER BORDER WITH RHODESIA HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE TO MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS INTO RHODESIA.

30. IT IS FAIRLY CLEAR THAT NEITHER ZAPU NOR ZANU IS YET CAPABLE OF ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE TERRITORIAL CONTROL OVER ANY SIGNIFICANT PART OF RHODESIA. STILL, THE REPEATED PROMISES OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT SUGGEST THAT CUBAN MILITARY PERSONNEL MAY BEGIN ACCOMPANYING GUERRILLA UNITS INTO RHODESIA. THIS SORT OF INVOLVEMENT WOULD NOT BE UNPRECEDENTED; IT OCCURRED IN GUINEA-BISSAU AND IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE ANGOLAN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE. IT WOULD, HOWEVER, REPRESENT A QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN CUBA'S INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND WOULD INCUR THE RISK OF BRINGING

SECRET

PAGE 13 STATE 078940

SOUTH AFRICA INTO THE CONFLICT.

31. FROM THE CUBAN STANDPOINT, THE LATTER DEVELOPMENT MIGHT NOT BE ALTOGETHER UNDESIRABLE SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO DISCREDIT, IF NOT DESTROY, AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE CUBANS ARE NOW CONTEMPLATING DEPLOYMENT OF REGULAR COMBAT

UNITS IN RHODESIA, AS THIS WOULD EXPOSE CUBA TO A POSSIBLE HUMILIATING DEFEAT AT THE HANDS OF RHODESIAN FORCES, PERHAPS ASSISTED BY SOUTH AFRICA.

32. LOOKING BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, CUBA PROBABLY FEELS FAIRLY SANGUINE ABOUT RHODESIA, WHETHER THERE IS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OR A MILITARY SOLUTION. OTHER THINGS BEING EQUAL, THE CUBANS MIGHT WELL PREFER THE LATTER SINCE IT WOULD ESTABLISH ZAPU'S SUPREMACY OVER RIVAL NATIONALIST LEADERS AND COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT CUBAN/SOVIET ASSISTANCE, THEREBY LAYING THE BASIS FOR FURTHER INFLUENCE OVER THE NEW REGIME. THE CUBANS PROBABLY ARE WILLING TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MILITARY EFFORT

WITH ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT, TRAINING, AND EVEN SELECTED PERSONNEL -- UP TO A POINT; BUT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD ATTEMPT A MAJOR TROOP COMMITMENT, PARTICULARLY AS LONG AS THEY REMAIN TIED DOWN IN ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA.

33. CUBA WOULD PROBABLY BE WILLING TO ENDORSE A DEAL BETWEEN SMITH AND THE NATIONALISTS WHICH INCLUDED ZAPU AND NKOMO, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT NKOMO WOULD EVENTUALLY DOMINATE A BLACK MAJORITY REGIME UNDER ANY ARRANGEMENT HE WOULD ACCEPT. CUBA CANNOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT AN ACCOMMODATION EXCLUDING NKOMO OR PLACING HIM AT A DISADVANTAGE. THE CUBANS UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THEIR SUPPORT FOR NKOMO
SECRET

PAGE 14 STATE 078940

HAS PLACED HIM SUFFICIENTLY IN THEIR DEBT TO INSURE CONTINUING INFLUENCE, AND IN ANY CASE, THEY PROBABLY FEEL THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO DEVELOP GOOD, IF NOT CLOSE, RELATIONS WITH OTHER BLACK NATIONALIST LEADERS AS THEY HAVE DONE ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA. IT IS UNLIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT HAVANA WILL PRESS NKOMO TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT, AND THE CUBANS MAY WELL ADVISE HIM FIRST TO ESTABLISH ZAPU AS A CREDIBLE MILITARY FORCE BY CARRYING OUT SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS INSIDE RHODESIA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

34. THE NEED TO DO SO MAY NOW APPEAR MORE PRESSING IN VIEW OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN INTERNAL SETTLEMENT INVOLVING SMITH, MUZOREWA, AND SITHOLE. NKOMO, PREDICTABLY, HAS DENOUNCED THE AGREEMENT AS A SELL-OUT, AND IT IS UNLIKELY TO GAIN SUPPORT FROM THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS.

35. THUS THE CUBANS WOULD HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE DIPLOMATICALLY IN SUPPORTING A ZAPU OFFENSIVE AGAINST A ZIMBABWEAN TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT, EVEN ONE THAT IS PREDOMINANTLY

BLACK. TACTICALLY IT WOULD MAKE SENSE, WHETHER NKOMO'S OBJECTIVE IS TO FORCE SMITH TO INCLUDE ZAPU IN A MORE FORTHCOMING SETTLEMENT OR TO OBTAIN AN EVENTUAL MILITARY VICTORY. AN INTENSIFIED GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN COULD ALSO MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO DEMONSTRATE POPULAR SUPPORT IF RHODESIAN BLACKS ARE INTIMIDATED FROM COOPERATING WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF PARTICIPATING IN ELECTIONS.

CONCLUSION

SECRET

PAGE 15 STATE 078940

36. CUBA'S AFRICAN POLICY IS AT ONCE PRINCIPLED AND OPPORTUNISTIC. CASTRO HAS MADE NO SECRET OF HIS INTENTION TO SUPPORT BLACK NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS AGAINST WHITE MINORITY REGIMES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH NON-ALIGNED AND LEFT-LEANING GOVERNMENTS. HE INSISTS THAT IT IS NOT ONLY CUBA'S SOVEREIGN RIGHT BUT ALSO ITS DUTY TO "PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM" IN AFRICA.

37. AT THE SAME TIME, THE LEVEL OF CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IS GUIDED BY A PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT OF RISKS VS. OPPORTUNITIES. THUS THE CUBANS ARE PROVIDING TRAINING AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO SWAPO AND ON A SMALLER SCALE TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN ANC, BUT THEY HAVE SO FAR REFRAINED FROM DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN EITHER NAMIBIA OR SOUTH AFRICA BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER THE HAZARDS TOO GREAT AND THE POLITICO-MILITARY SITUATION TOO UNCERTAIN.

38. CUBA'S AFRICAN ACTIVITIES IN SYMBIOSIS WITH THE SOVIET UNION HAVE ENABLED CASTRO TO PLAY THE PROMINENT INTERNATIONAL ROLE HE HAS LONG COVETED BUT WHICH UNTIL RECENTLY HAS ELUDED HIM. HE CLEARLY BELIEVES THAT THE POLITICAL GAINS FAR OUTWEIGH THE COST, AND HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPLOIT SELECTIVELY OTHER OPENINGS FOR EXPANDING CUBAN INFLUENCE IN AFRICA AND THE THIRD WORLD. END TEXT.

VANCE

UNQUOTE COOPER UNQUOTE COOPER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 sep 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: INFORMATION EXCHANGE, INVASIONS, COMMITTEE MEETINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 28 mar 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978STATE078940
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: INR/RAR:DSMITH; EUR/RPM:TMSAVAGE
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D780133-1175
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t197803126/baaafcfcd.tel
Line Count: 1725
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 846d5ebb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN INR
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 32
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) STATE 61698 (NOTAL); B) USNATO 1563 (NOTAL)
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 14 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3167083
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: POLADS SPECIAL PROJECTS -- SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY PENETRATION IN AFRICA
TAGS: PORG, XA, CU, UR, NATO
To: USNATO INFO HAVANA MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/846d5ebb-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014